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F o rew o rd
For the second time in less than a decade, the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce is conducting
hearings on the performance of the public accounting profession.
The AICPA appeared before the subcommittee on March 6. Our testimony
concentrated on
•
•
•
•

The quality improvement programs of the Division for CPA Firms.
Actions taken to enhance auditor independence.
Steps taken to assist smaller CPA firms.
Improvements made in the standards-setting process.

The testimony was accompanied by a paper on the quality of independent audits
that discussed
• The distinction between a business failure and an audit failure.
• The nature of audit failures and their implications for the general level of audit
quality in the profession.
•
•
•
•

The effectiveness of existing regulation of the profession.
The standards-setting process.
Independence.
The performance of management advisory services for audit clients.

Because of the importance of issues raised by these hearings, we are sending a
copy of our testimony to each AICPA member.
New York
March 8 , 1985
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I. INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I am Philip B. Chenok, president
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA or Institute), the
national professional organization of certified public accountants (CPAs) in the
United States. Its service to the profession and to the public spans almost one hun
dred years. Today, membership consists of over 230,000 CPAs in public practice,
in industry, in education, and in government. Over the years, the AICPA has been
a principal force in developing standards, educational programs, and professional
publications to improve the quality of services provided by CPAs. The Institute is
widely recognized as the authoritative voice of the accounting profession.
We are here today to help the committee evaluate the effectiveness and indepen
dence of audits of the financial statements of American business. In the hope that
our comments might provide useful perspective for this inquiry, the Institute is
submitting as part of this testimony a paper titled “ AICPA Comments on the Qual
ity of Independent Audits.”
In that paper we discuss the nature of financial statements and the audit function,
explain the difference between “ business failures” and “ audit failures,” set out the
elements of the existing regulatory structure, comment on the process for setting
accounting and auditing standards, discuss the concept of independence, and iden
tify certain current projects designed to strengthen audit quality. These are all mat
ters of considerable importance and some complexity, and I commend that paper to
your reading.
Rather than summarize our paper, I would like to take the time allotted to me to
discuss the actions taken by the AICPA in response to concerns raised when Con
gress last examined the accounting profession. These concerns related to
• Whether there was a need for a federally legislated organization to regulate
CPA firms that practice before the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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• Whether auditors were sufficiently independent of their clients.
• Whether smaller accounting firms could compete effectively for audits of
public companies.
• Whether the process for setting accounting and auditing standards should be
opened to public scrutiny.
We believe the profession has dealt effectively with these matters in the inter
vening years.

II. ACTIONS TAKEN TO REGULATE CPA
FIRMS
The AICPA Division for CPA Firms was created in 1977 to improve the quality
of accounting and auditing services provided by independent public account
ing firms. This initiative represents a major commitment to professional self
regulation.
The division is comprised of two sections: A Private Companies Practice
Section for firms that provide accounting and auditing services to nonpublic
entities and an SEC Practice Section for firms whose audit practice includes SEC
registrants.
Each section has significant membership requirements, the most important of
which calls for a critical quality assurance review by other CPAs of a member
firm’s accounting and auditing practice every three years. Reports on these
reviews are available to the public. In the case of the SEC Practice Section, a firm’s
required response to its reviewers’ written suggestions for improvement along
with the suggestions themselves are also available for public inspection.
When significant problems with a firm’s quality control policies or procedures
are identified, the firm may be required to agree to revisits by the reviewers to
determine that necessary corrective actions were taken, to submit to accelerated
peer reviews, or to provide additional education for specified staff. If a specific
audit engagement is found to have been performed in a substandard manner, firms
are required to take appropriate corrective action, such as performance of omitted
auditing procedures, correction of financial statements, or withdrawal of their
audit report.
All of the activities of the SEC Practice Section of the division are under the
scrutiny of the Public Oversight Board, consisting of five highly respected, inde
pendent individuals. The SEC has access to the peer review process through the
Public Oversight Board, thus providing further assurance that there is appropriate
recognition of the public interest in the way these activities are carried out.
As a complement to the peer review process, SEC Practice Section member
firms also accept an affirmative obligation to report to the section’s Special Investi
gations Committee any litigation alleging audit failure with respect to SEC clients.
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That committee determines whether corrective steps should be taken to provide
assurance of a firm’s continuing ability to perform audits in conformity with pro
fessional standards. The committee is also charged with determining whether
there is a need to reconsider the adequacy of existing professional standards.
The division’s activities are corrective rather than punitive. Some have urged
the division for CPA Firms to sanction member firms through fines, censures, and
the like, to be imposed with attendant publicity.
From its very beginning, the division’s emphasis has been on remedial action
designed to strengthen quality control, to prevent recurrences of problems, and to
correct any noted deficiencies in the practice of member firms. Formal sanctioning
powers have been reserved as a means of inducing member firm cooperation in
bringing about the necessary remedial action. When appropriate, sanctions are
imposed by others — the SEC, the state boards of accountancy, or the courts. The
division’s programs are intended to complement those other aspects of the total
regulatory structure, not to duplicate them.
Division members audit about 86 percent of all publicly held companies,
accounting for 99 percent of the revenue reported by such companies. While this
coverage is an outstanding accomplishment considering the voluntary nature of
the program, division membership is expected to increase further as AICPA mem
bers and the public become more aware of its significance and of the usefulness of
peer review reports. In mid-1984 the two sections began a major information pro
gram to increase public awareness of the division.
We believe the foregoing record of accomplishment adequately responds to the
concerns expressed by the Congress and that there is no need for a federally legis
lated organization to regulate CPA firms that practice before the SEC.

///. ACTIONS TAKEN TO ENHANCE AUDITOR
INDEPENDENCE
Let me now turn to auditor independence, the hallmark of the accounting profes
sion. Independence assures that CPAs act with integrity and objectivity. Not only
must the auditor maintain an independent mental attitude with respect to the entity
being audited, he or she must refrain from financial interests or personal or
employment relationships that would compromise the audit function. The concept
of independence must be carefully guarded in a changing environment, and it must
be emphasized to each succeeding generation of CPAs. I would like to summarize
some of the actions we have taken in recent years to do this.
• AICPA has encouraged the formation of audit committees including outside
directors and has published a booklet to assist companies in that undertaking.
It is now common practice for auditors to attend annual meetings of public
companies to respond to shareholder questions.
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• The membership requirements of the SEC Practice Section include, with
respect to SEC registrants, periodic rotation of the partners in charge of those
audits, concurring review by a partner not otherwise involved with the
engagement, and a report to the audit committee of any disagreement with
management that, if not satisfactorily resolved, would have caused the issu
ance of a qualified report on the financial statements.
• The SEC Practice Section requires member firms to report to audit commit
tees of SEC registrants the total fees received for management advisory ser
vices during the years under audit and a description of the types of such
services rendered. Also, SECPS member firms are required to report, for the
section’s public files, aggregated information with respect to fees received for
management advisory services. Finally, special attention is being given in
peer reviews to the quality of the audit work performed for SEC clients where
fees from MAS engagements equal or exceed audit fees.
Our paper on audit quality discusses in some detail why the AICPA believes that
it would be a serious mistake to prohibit the performance of management advisory
services by independent auditors. CPAs are called upon to provide these services
because of their objectivity and analytical skills and their knowledge of a client’s
business. Moreover, no compelling evidence has been found that MAS has
impaired independence or adversely impacted the quality of audits. Indeed,
knowledge gained in providing these services often complements information
obtained in the audit process and enhances audit reliability.

IV. ACTIONS TAKEN TO ASSIST SMALLER
CPA FIRMS
The third area of concern in the earlier hearings related to the ability of smaller
accounting firms to compete effectively for audits of public companies. Since
then, smaller firms believe the situation has worsened as competition within the
profession has increased substantially, in part because of changes made in the
advertising and solicitation rules of the Institute’s Code of Professional Ethics,
which were necessitated by changes in the application of the antitrust laws to pro
fessional organizations.
During this period, recommendations of a special committee organized to con
sider the needs of small and medium-sized firms have largely been implemented.
Moreover, through the division’s peer review process, firms of all sizes can dem
onstrate that they are able to render accounting and auditing services in conformity
with professional standards.
Finally, the Technical Issues Committee of the Private Companies Practice Sec
tion has been active and effective in speaking out on matters, including accounting
and auditing standards, that affect private companies and the CPAs who serve
them.
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V. ACTIONS TAKEN TO IMPROVE
PARTICIPATION IN THE STANDARD-SETTING PROCESS
Prior congressional concerns also dealt with the need for greater participation in
the standard-setting process. The Institute has added three non-CPA public repre
sentatives to its board of directors, and has opened to the public the policy-making
meetings of the Institute’s governing Council and its senior technical committees,
such as the Auditing Standards Board. Frequent meetings are held with representa
tives of user groups and others to keep them informed of projects in process. Press
releases are issued on important developments, exposure drafts of proposed pro
nouncements are distributed to interested parties, and public hearings are held on
controversial subjects.
Efforts have been made to encourage members from smaller firms to serve on
senior committees, and limitations exist with respect to the participation of those
from the eight largest firms.

VI. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, Mr. Chairman, the financial reporting system in the United
States depends on the integrity of all those involved in the process — management
that reports on activities and independent auditors who objectively review those
reports. The AICPA will continue to strive to maintain and improve the quality of
accounting practice and independent audits. As indicated in our detailed paper,
some special studies have been begun in important areas to improve audit quality
and others have been under way for some time. In addition, there is an ongoing
effort by the AICPA to monitor the effectiveness of auditing standards and to make
changes when they are called for. Let me list our most recent initiatives:
1. Discussions are being held with representatives of other organizations to
determine whether a multi-organizational effort might be useful in identify
ing ways to improve the prevention and detection of fraud.
2. A re-examination of the existing auditing guidance with respect to bank loan
loss reserves is being undertaken.
3. A special AICPA committee is studying the relevance of the AICPA Code of
Professional Ethics and the adequacy of the related enforcement machinery
in today’s environment. The special committee is expected to issue a draft
report in the fall of 1985.
4. A task force of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division for CPA
Firms has been studying steps the section might take to enhance profession
alism in the application of accounting standards. Such steps might include
changes in the section’s membership requirements and certain changes in the
scope of peer review.

7

5. In accordance with the 1984 recommendations of a special committee that
studied the structure and operations of the SEC Practice Section, the section
is presently considering how the public might be made more aware of the
procedures and findings of its Special Investigations Committee.
Mr. Chairman, I want to assure you and the subcommittee that the members of
the AICPA are dedicated to strengthening the system of financial reporting. We
recognize the paramount importance of the public interest in our work and will
carefully study the record of these hearings in an effort to make further improve
ments. The accounting profession is committed to standards of excellence and
integrity, and we believe it is deserving of the confidence of the investing public
and the Congress.
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AICPA Comments on the
Quality of Independent Audits
A Paper Submitted With
Oral Testimony of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Before the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
U.S. House of Representatives,
March 6, 1985

INTRODUCTION
Periodically, members of Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission,
among others, express concern about the quality of audits being performed by
independent CPAs. Although other factors may be involved, these concerns arise
when there has been a sudden upswing in the number of publicly traded companies
that unexpectedly encounter severe financial difficulties or file for protection under
the bankruptcy statutes. The concerns are heightened when very large companies
are involved, their shareholders and credit grantors suffer heavy losses, and the
financial difficulties are widely reported in the national financial press.
A combination of the frequency of such business failures, the large amounts of
losses incurred, and the sudden plunge in the prestige and reputation of the major
companies involved may signal that something is going awry that requires atten
tion. This is particularly true when there is a concentration of failures in a single
industry. For example, a number of banks and other financial institutions have
recently failed. In earlier times, similar problems afflicted the real estate invest
ment trust and franchising industries. When this happens, attention is frequently
focused on the financial reporting by the failed entities and on independent audi
tors and the quality of their work.

BUSINESS FAILURES AND THE AUDIT
FUNCTION
Failures of large business enterprises invariably are accompanied by multi-million
dollar lawsuits against their independent auditors on behalf of shareholders and
creditors. Indeed, the suits often focus on the CPA firms because they are usually
the “ deepest pockets” available in the financial rubble of a failed company.
Asserting their reliance on the audited financial statements, the plaintiffs allege
that the statements were misleading and that the auditors failed to comply with
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professional standards in examining and reporting on them. The extensive media
coverage of these events often conveys the impression that an actual audit failure
has occurred.
To be sure, while the objective of CPAs is to prevent all audit failures, auditors
are human and performance failures can and do occur. But a business failure or the
filing of a lawsuit or media notoriety does not necessarily mean that there has been
an audit failure. Even payments made by CPA firms in settlement of lawsuits are
not proof of an audit failure. Such payments may be made simply because they are
less than the potential legal and other costs of defending the firm in litigation.
Businesses fail for a variety of reasons that are unrelated to the financial report
ing process. Poor management, societal or technological developments, domestic
and foreign competition, and changes in the economy are some of the major causes
of business failures.
Investors and creditors are responsible for assessing the risk of investing in or
lending to a company. Accordingly, in making that judgment, they need to con
sider a wide range of information in addition to the historical financial information
included in audited financial statements. The quality of management, develop
ments in the industry, labor relations, marketing and product development plans,
and the state of the economy are some of the factors that may be as relevant or even
more relevant than historical financial statement information. As a result, inves
tors and creditors can make bad judgments about a company and its future pros
pects even though the audit of the historical financial statements is without fault.
The role of the independent auditor is not to guarantee that investors and credi
tors will not make bad judgments and suffer losses. Neither is it to advise users of
financial statements on the desirability of investing in or lending to a company.
The proper, long-standing role of the independent auditor is to provide the pub
lic with reasonable assurance that the representations of management reflected in
the company’s financial statements and the related disclosures comply with gener
ally accepted accounting principles. The independent audit should bring a trained,
experienced, professional oversight to the financial reporting process and, thus,
serves to deter the issuance of misleading financial statements by management.
Indeed, in a January 1985 Pace University survey of Fortune 500 and private
companies, 107 of the 117 respondents indicated that they would have an annual
audit by a public accounting firm even if it were not required. The most frequently
cited reasons were that the independent audit imposes discipline on the entire
financial system and that an independent audit is required for credibility of finan
cial statements.
The broad question of whether independent auditors are satisfactorily fulfilling
their intended role leads to a number of inquiries:
1. Do the current reports of alleged audit failures indicate a deterioration of
audit quality?
2. Is there sufficient regulation of independent auditors to safeguard against
negligence or lack of objectivity or integrity?
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3. Would changes in the present system of establishing financial accounting
and auditing standards reduce the incidence of business and audit failures?
4. Is the performance of management advisory services for audit clients impair
ing the independence, integrity, or objectivity of auditors?

ALLEGED AUDIT FAILURES AND AUDIT
QUALITY
Professional standards require the auditor to plan his examination to search for
misstatements that would have a material effect on the financial statements, but
they do not call for extended auditing procedures to detect fraud unless the audi
tor’s examination causes him to believe material fraud may exist. This is because
the cost of an audit must be reasonable in relation to the expected benefits. How
ever, auditors can and do detect fraud in the course of audit engagements. An inde
pendent auditor’s standard report implicitly indicates his belief that the financial
statements taken as a whole are not materially misstated as a result of error or
irregularities.
As previously discussed, business failures are not caused by audit failures.
Business failures may be caused, or hidden, by a material management fraud that
goes undetected by the independent auditor until severe financial difficulties or
some other events cause the fraud to be revealed. In these situations, notwithstand
ing the auditor’s compliance with generally accepted auditing standards, forgery,
unrecorded transactions or extensive collusion can make some management frauds
exceedingly difficult if not impossible for auditors to detect.
The detection of management fraud is one of the most difficult problems faced
by independent auditors, one that has received and continues to receive a great deal
of attention by the profession.
Professional auditing standards have long included the concept of selective test
ing. Consistent with that concept, auditors rarely audit all of the transactions that
compose an individual item (for example, accounts receivables) in the financial
statements because the cost to do so would be prohibitive. Because of cost consid
erations, a sampling method is also used by the Internal Revenue Service in audit
ing tax returns and by the Securities and Exchange Commission in reviewing
filings by registrants.
Auditors study and evaluate a company’s system of internal control to decide on
the nature, timing, and extent of tests to be performed. Nevertheless, it is possible
for any control system to be circumvented, in which case even an audit of all trans
actions may fail to disclose the fraud. Thus, rather than being indicative of a gen
eral problem with audit quality in the profession, the failure to detect management
fraud is more likely to be the result of the sophistication with which the fraud was
carried out or the result of a human error on the part of the individual auditor. Also,
to be frank, courts have concluded in rare cases that the conduct of an individual
13

auditor was felonious. But in all of these situations, the auditing firm is as much the
victim of the fraud as are the investors and creditors.
In addition to undetected fraud, there are other circumstances that give rise to
perceptions of audit failure and concerns about audit quality. For example, a com
pany, with the auditor’s knowledge and consent, may have selected an acceptable
accounting treatment that presents its financial condition and operating results in
the most favorable light. If the business subsequently fails or encounters severe
financial problems, the auditor’s acceptance of that treatment is questioned in the
light of hindsight.
Since these situations are not cases of oversight by the auditor, they are not
“ audit failures” in the sense that errors or irregularities were not detected. But
some critics of the profession contend that cases involving accounting treatment
questions are even more serious because they see them as involving faulty judg
ment or, even worse, a lack of objectivity or integrity on the part of the auditor.
Auditors do insist on accounting changes when the appropriate accounting is
clear. But what accounting standard is appropriate in a particular circumstance is
not always clear. Accounting standards require the application of judgment. This
stems from the fact that most important items in financial statements cannot be
measured precisely but have to be estimated. For example, the preparer of finan
cial statements has to estimate the amount of accounts receivable that will not be
collected because goods may be returned or customers may default, the amount of
inventory that should be considered obsolete, the useful lives of property and
equipment, the amounts of possible losses from such things as product warranty
claims or lawsuits, and whether and how revenue should be recognized as, for
example, in a construction project extending over several years.
Thus, although financial statements are presented as numbers that may appear to
be precise, the amounts are and can be only reasonable approximations of the
results of a company’s transactions. Complete accuracy is rendered impossible by
the fact that financial statements are issued at regular points in time while certain of
the underlying transactions are still not complete and important events that will
have an effect on those statements have not or may not yet have taken place. There
fore, the fact that an accounting judgment made at the time of the audit may be
shown by subsequent events to have been overly optimistic or conservative does
not mean that the auditor’s and management’s judgment or conduct was flawed.
Understandably, auditors sometimes differ in their judgments about the
accounting treatment that is appropriate when applying accounting standards to
complex transactions. Concerns arise when companies, especially those in finan
cial trouble, take advantage of the differences in judgments among CPA firms to
seek the answer most favorable to them. This practice places added pressure on
auditors. But few auditors would knowingly risk such severe penalties as legal lia
bility or loss of reputation for independence and integrity by agreeing to account
ing treatments that were not consistent with their firmly-held professional
convictions.

14

Another source of concern stems from cases where accounting measurement
and disclosure standards are fully complied with and no fraud is involved, but a
company unexpectedly fails. Critics generally insist that auditors should issue an
explicit warning when a company is in a precarious condition.
As previously indicated, the auditor’s role is to express an opinion on the con
formity of the financial statements and related disclosures with generally accepted
accounting principles. Those principles call for disclosure of uncertainties and
contingencies in appropriate circumstances. Investors and creditors are expected
to study, among other things, the financial statements and to assess the company’s
financial condition in the light of their own objectives and their tolerance for risk.
Of course, auditors do qualify their opinions when questions about the ability of a
company to continue in existence raise significant doubts about the amounts and
classification of assets and liabilities. Such a qualification involves complex pro
fessional judgments and should be given only when circumstances demand.
In summary, a business failure is not the same as an audit failure, and actual
audit failures need to be carefully distinguished from perceived failures. Perceived
audit failures often stem from a lack of understanding of what reasonably can be
expected to be achieved by audits or of the facts in a particular case. Misunder
standings of the nature, purpose, and limitations of financial statements also con
tribute to misperceptions that audit failures have occurred.
Actual audit failures are generally the result of honest human error on the part of
individual auditors rather than a reflection of the general quality of work by their
firms or the profession. Such errors may involve failing to detect material errors or
irregularities or making good-faith judgments on accounting matters that are
proven faulty by subsequent events.
Financial statements are necessarily only a reasonable approximation of a com
pany’s financial condition and results of operations. For this and other reasons,
independent audits do not and cannot provide absolute assurance on the accuracy
of financial statements. However, independent audits do provide a considerable
measure of assurance that financial statements are not misleading within the con
text of generally accepted accounting principles. Therefore, it is important to all
users of financial statements that audits be performed as effectively as possible.
This is an objective not only of the SEC and of Congress, but is of prime impor
tance to the AICPA.

REGULATION OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS
A major question in a review of the quality of audits is whether there is sufficient
regulation of independent auditors. Regulation and disciplinary machinery are
generally seen as means of preventing — through the threat of sanctions— dishon
esty or carelessness on the part of independent auditors. While this cannot guaran
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tee that honest mistakes will not be made, regulation and the prospect of penalty
are believed to be appropriate countervailing forces to the pressures on objectivity
and integrity encountered by auditors in the marketplace. This general proposition
is not disputed, but the nature and extent of regulation required and the point at
which diminishing effectiveness is reached is the subject of different opinions.
The AICPA believes that the body of regulation presently in place is basically
sufficient and that auditors are in fact exercising a high degree of objectivity and
integrity. This is not to assert that problems do not exist or that improvements can
not be made. Indeed, the public accounting profession constantly strives for
improvement. The AICPA believes that the present framework for bringing about
needed improvements is adequate and appropriate to the task and that increased
regulation would not be likely to yield significant improvements.
In any event, the types of losses from sudden business failures that give rise to
concerns about the quality of financial statements and audits will continue to occur
from time to time. Added regulation of auditors is not a solution to the problem of
business failures because they stem from factors other than the quality of financial
reporting and auditing. Although financial statements can provide information that
may foreshadow the possibility of failure, they are but one of several tools that
should be used by investors and creditors in forming judgments about the financial
prospects of a company.
The AICPA’s judgment about the adequacy of existing regulation is based upon
many years of experience with the mosaic of regulation currently in place as
described below:
1. To become and remain licensed under state law administered by state boards
of accountancy, independent auditors must —
a. Meet minimum education requirements.
b. Pass a rigorous uniform CPA examination.
c. Have experience in the practice of public accounting to become licensed
in most jurisdictions.
d. Show evidence of good moral character.
e. Engage in continuing professional education to remain licensed in most
jurisdictions.
2. CPAs and their firms are required to comply with extensive regulations
promulgated by private-sector standards-setting bodies as well as by the
Securities and Exchange Commission and by a number of other federal and
state regulatory bodies. Those standards and principles, together with
related interpretations and guides, constitute a body of professional literature
unparalleled anywhere else in the world.
3. CPAs and their firms are required to comply with the codes of ethics of state
CPA societies, state boards of accountancy, and the AICPA. Failure to do so
can result in loss of membership in these organizations and loss of the state
license to practice as a CPA. The codes contain requirements, among others,
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relating to independence, integrity, and objectivity, and to compliance with
generally accepted auditing standards and accounting principles.
4. CPA firms auditing approximately 86 percent of the publicly traded compa
nies in the United States — which represent almost 99 percent of the annual
sales of all such companies — are members of the SEC Practice Section of
the AICPA Division for CPA Firms. Member firms agree to —
a. Peer reviews of the quality controls of their accounting and auditing prac
tices every three years. (Reports on these peer reviews are available to the
public.)
b. Second partner reviews of audits of SEC clients.
c. Rotation of audit partners in charge of audits of SEC registrants every
seven years.
d. Extensive continuing professional education for all professional person
nel, not just those who are CPAs.
e. File annual reports with the AICPA containing key firm data. (The
reports are open to public scrutiny.)
f. Report specified alleged audit failures to the section’s Special Investiga
tions Committee, which determines whether corrective action is required
by the firms involved or whether there is a need to reconsider the ade
quacy of professional standards.
g. Comply with penalties imposed by the section’s executive committee for
failure to comply with membership requirements.
All of the section’s activities and records are open to review by an indepen
dent Public Oversight Board (POB) with its own staff. The POB appraises
and issues an annual report on the section’s activities and maintains close
liaison with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
5. CPAs and their firms practicing before the SEC are subject to private investi
gations, injunctive actions, and disciplinary actions under SEC Rule 2(e).
6. CPAs and their firms are subject to professional liability lawsuits filed by
private plaintiffs. CPAs may also be named as defendants in criminal
actions.
The foregoing represents a formidable array of regulation that, taken as a whole,
is more than adequate to cause independent auditors, in their own self-interest, to
strive for professional excellence in their practices.
This is particularly true with regard to the exposure of independent auditors to
lawsuits for millions of dollars of damages. No CPA or CPA firm is likely to take
lightly the enormous cost in time and legal fees as well as damage to reputation that
stems from being a defendant in a professional liability suit. Accountants’ liability
insurance is small comfort because of escalating premiums and deductible
amounts (which, for large firms, can amount to millions of dollars) borne by the
insured.
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While CPAs are driven to perform at a high level by their professional pride, it is
also true that exposure to legal action is a strong deterrent to substandard perfor
mance by independent auditors. The pressures that flow from being paid by the
audited company or from competition for clients pale in significance in the light of
the threat of being sued for damages in amounts that could, given the size of recent
awards and settlements, put an auditing firm out of business.
If anything, the threat of liability suits may be too strong. Contrary to the belief
of some, improvement in the performance of independent auditors might well flow
from carefully limiting rather than expanding their exposure to legal liability.
No scheme of regulation — by firms, by peers, or by government — will ever
prevent all audit failures because auditing is a human art subject to individual
human error. Neither will it guarantee that all individual auditors will be objective
and honest any more than all crime can be eliminated by legislation and enforce
ment. But the incidence of dishonesty or negligence on the part of CPAs has histor
ically been extremely low in relation to other groups in society. The existence of a
high level of integrity among auditors and the strength of the countervailing pres
sures embodied in the present system of regulation supports the AICPA’s belief
that major changes in the regulatory structure would not yield significant benefits.
In this connection, it should be noted that the AICPA has a long record of coop
eration with the SEC, other regulatory bodies, and the state boards of accountancy
to obtain their views and refine and strengthen the effectiveness of the current sys
tem. For example, the AICPA worked extensively with the SEC to resolve differ
ences of opinion on the approach to peer review and reached agreement on the
nature and extent of the SEC’s access to the peer review process. Representatives
of the AICPA Auditing Standards Board meet frequently with SEC staff to discuss
projects on the board’s agenda and issues needing consideration. State boards of
accountancy, in connection with their disciplinary proceedings, have required cer
tain firms to join the Division for CPA Firms and undergo peer review. Coopera
tion will continue.

FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING
STANDARDS
Any evaluation of the quality of financial reporting and the related performance of
independent auditors requires consideration of the adequacy of financial account
ing and reporting standards, auditing standards, and the manner in which such
standards are established. Since the SEC has statutory authority to set generally
accepted accounting principles (synonymous with financial accounting and report
ing standards), that agency is expected to act whenever it believes that an inade
quacy exists. While it has taken the initiative in some instances, the commission
has historically followed a policy of looking to the private sector for the setting of
standards and applying its considerable influence when that seemed necessary.
Accordingly, financial accounting and reporting standards in the United States
have been set primarily by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
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since 1973. Prior to that time, the AICPA performed that function through its
Accounting Principles Board and a predecessor Accounting Procedures Commit
tee.
Information about the structure, function, and record of the FASB is not covered
here because that body is independent of the AICPA. However, the AICPA
strongly supports the FASB and believes that it has a commendable record of
achievement.
The setting of financial accounting and reporting standards will always be con
troversial and subject to sharp criticism regardless of the body responsible and
whether that body is in the public or the private sector. This is so for a number of
reasons:
1. The complexity of business transactions makes the substance of such trans
actions — which should govern the accounting — subject to differing
interpretations.
2. Standards are man-made conventions designed to achieve reasonable uni
formity and comparability. Judgments, often based upon estimates, are
involved in both their development and application.
3. There are differing points of view about how standards should be structured
and the degree of specificity that should be followed.
4. Standards have an important impact on and are of high interest to companies,
auditors, financial analysts, investors, creditors, government regulators,
labor unions, and others. The conflicting interests of these diverse groups
guarantee that someone’s ox will be gored whenever a more restrictive stand
ard is adopted.
As should be expected, the FASB has received its share of criticism, elements of
which are often dramatically contradictory. The criticisms take the following
form:
1. There are too many standards vs. there is not enough timely guidance.
2. Standards are too detailed vs. too many areas are left to judgments.
3. Too many alternatives exist vs. not enough alternatives exist to deal with
special circumstances.
These criticisms reflect the tension between the perceived effectiveness of dealing
with problems through detailed rules and the contrary need to provide guidance in
a form that will accommodate changing and unique circumstances, some of which
cannot be foreseen when standards are being considered.
Financial accounting and reporting standards are a framework for providing
users with reliable financial information that is relevant and that meets reasonable
cost-benefit tests. The problem is that what is relevant changes with circum
stances, and judgments about costs and benefits are highly subjective. It should not
be surprising, therefore, that the standards-setting process is the target of sharp
criticism by those who disagree with or are adversely affected by a standard. In
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evaluating the merits of those criticisms, consideration should be given to two
important facts:
1. Although there are exceptions, the quality of financial reporting by the vast
majority of the more than ten thousand companies whose securities are pub
licly traded continues to be at a high level. Users of financial statements gen
erally do not complain that the FASB has disregarded their needs. Indeed,
the FASB often has to emphasize to users the importance of certain informa
tion, such as the effect of changing price levels on the financial condition of a
company.
2. The vast majority of existing standards have been developed within the pri
vate sector in cooperation and consultation with the SEC. Nevertheless, the
SEC has not been reluctant to exercise its statutory mandate by the direct
issuance of standards.
In addition, the present standards-setting structure provides several advantages:
1. The substantial costs of research and due process are borne by the private
sector.
2. The SEC can objectively evaluate standards issued by a private sector body.
Were it to be the initial issuer of a standard, a substantial amount of its time
and resources would be spent in dealing with the comments of others and in
reconciling different points of view.
3. Support for standards is likely to be better if those affected by them partici
pate in their development. The private sector is best able to foster a participa
tory effort.
It is for all the foregoing reasons that the AICPA believes that major changes in
the present standards-setting process are not warranted.

AUDITING STANDARDS
Financial accounting and reporting standards provide a framework for the prepara
tion of the financial statements that CPAs audit. Auditing standards govern the way
in which independent auditors conduct those audits. Auditing standards are impor
tant to regulators in evaluating the general quality of audit work and to them and
the courts in judging the performance of CPAs in specific audits.
The AICPA has set auditing standards for over sixty-five years, although most
of the activity has taken place since 1939 and, as business has become more com
plex, the pace has increased in recent years. For example, between 1939 and 1972
the AICPA Committee on Auditing Procedure issued fifty-four Statements on
Auditing Procedure; between 1972 and 1984, successor bodies issued forty-nine
Statements on Auditing Standards. In addition, seventy-three staff auditing inter
pretations have been issued, and twenty-six accounting and audit guides relating to
specific industries are currently outstanding.
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As a result of recommendations of a Special Committee to Study the Structure of
the Auditing Standards Executive Committee in May 1978, the AICPA made a
number of improvements in the auditing standards-setting process. It reduced the
size and changed the composition of what is now known as the Auditing Standards
Board; changed its voting requirements to require 60 percent (previously 67 per
cent) in favor to adopt a proposed standard; opened board meetings to the public;
provided compensation to board members who requested it to facilitate participa
tion by individuals from smaller firms; and strengthened the staff. A 1983 AICPA
study confirmed the continuing appropriateness of these changes.
The reconstituted Auditing Standards Board is dealing on a timely basis with
auditing problems as they arise. It makes a major effort to obtain suggestions for
matters that should be added to its agenda. In the seven years ended December 31,
1984, it issued twenty-eight binding Statements on Auditing Standards that cover
important subjects such as quality control standards, going-concern problems,
audit sampling, audit risk and materiality, and reporting on internal accounting
control. The Auditing Standards Board has developed a body of standards and
interpretations that are the most comprehensive in the world. In addition, ten audit
and accounting guides were issued during the same period. These guides are booklength documents that help CPAs understand the problems of an industry and the
accounting and reporting practices appropriate to that industry, and provide guid
ance on the application of auditing standards.
The Auditing Standards Board recognizes its responsibilities to the public. Its
deliberations are held in meetings open to the public; it gives wide public exposure
to proposals for new standards. It meets frequently with the staff of the SEC. And it
conducts periodic liaison meetings with representatives of other groups, such as
the Financial Executives Institute (a preparer group), the Robert Morris Associates
(a user group), and the FASB, the body that sets accounting standards. The AICPA
believes that the present structure for setting auditing standards is working well
and is appropriate.

INDEPENDENCE
A discussion of the quality of independent audits would be incomplete without
addressing the subject of independence, an attribute of CPAs essential to public
reliance on audited financial statements. The concept of auditor independence
precludes relationships that would be likely to impair the auditor’s integrity or
objectivity.
As applied to independent auditors, integrity is an element of character that pre
vents CPAs from intentionally committing a fault of omission or commission in
their work. This does not mean that honest errors or mistakes will never occur.
Objectivity is the ability of CPAs to maintain an impartial attitude on all matters
relating to the audit of financial statements. It is the quality of being able to evalu
ate, express, and use facts without distortion by personal feelings, interests, or
biases.
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The AICPA’s Rules of Conduct dealing with independence are based on the cri
terion of whether reasonable persons, having knowledge of all the facts and taking
into account normal strength of character and behavior, would conclude that a par
ticular relationship would pose unacceptable threats to integrity or objectivity. The
rules proscribe two general categories of relationships with audit clients:
1. Certain financial relationships with clients, such as any form of direct or
material indirect financial interests. For example, this prohibits a CPA or any
of his partners from owning any stock, no matter how little, in a company
they audit or from participating in significant joint closely held investments
with an audit client or its officers, directors, or principal stockholders.
2. Relationships in which a CPA has in effect become a part of management or
an employee under management’s control.
A CPA having such a relationship with a client is prohibited from expressing an
opinion on the client’s financial statements. In addition, the rules are far more
extensive than any brief summary can indicate. For example, investments by a
spouse or dependent person are deemed to impair independence. Also, positions
held by close relatives can be deemed to affect independence.
The SEC, through its Financial Reporting Releases, has also promulgated
extensive restrictions to assure the independence of auditors. The AICPA has
worked closely with the SEC on auditor independence matters for many years.
CPA firms take great care to insure compliance with these independence rules.
Detailed prohibitions of such things as accepting gifts or favors from audit clients
are generally spelled out in written communications to all personnel, who are
warned that violators will be promptly punished. Firms also go to great lengths to
obtain assurance that their partners and professional staff are abiding by the prohi
bitions against financial relationships with clients. The peer review process of the
AICPA Division for CPA Firms tests compliance with the rules on auditor inde
pendence and when violators are found — there have been some — sees that
appropriate action is taken by the firm.
There are, no doubt, violations of the rules on independence that go undetected.
But to the best of the AICPA’s knowledge, compliance is generally at a very high
level.

PERFORMANCE OF MANAGEMENT ADVISORY
SERVICES FOR AUDIT CLIENTS
Management advisory services consist of a wide range of advice and technical
assistance to clients, including some that are audit clients, to help them improve
the use of their capabilities and resources. Concerns that providing MAS to audit
clients impairs auditor independence have been raised a number of times in recent
years.
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Numerous studies have been undertaken because of these concerns. The most
recent of these studies were by the Public Oversight Board of the SEC Practice
Section in 1979 and by an independent Commission on Auditor’s Responsibilities
in 1978. These studies found no evidence that such services had been a cause of an
audit failure or had resulted in an impairment of independence and did not recom
mend that prohibitions be imposed on the performance of MAS for audit clients.
Another recent study focused on the research to date, on liability lawsuits
against auditors and on complaints filed with state boards of accountancy. It con
cluded —
It is not apparent that a problem of any significance actually exists (K. St.
Pierre, “ Independence and Auditor’s Sanctions,” Journal o f Accounting,
Auditing, and Finance, Spring 1984).
That conclusion is further corroborated by the results of peer reviews of firms in
the SEC Practice Section. The Public Oversight Board stated in its 1983-84 annual
report that, based upon its tests of peer reviews, “ these procedures have not sur
faced any evidence that suggests . . . that performance of MAS by member firms
has diluted the objectivity required in the performance of the audit function.”
Those concerned about the effects of MAS on auditor independence often
express the fear that audit judgments will be unduly influenced by fees earned from
MAS engagements performed for audit clients. Such fees are, in fact, no more of a
pressure on audit independence than the audit fee itself. Moreover, there also are
strong countervailing forces, including the risk of loss of the right to practice and
the exposure to liability lawsuits, that bolster independence. In addition, profes
sional discipline and pride and the fact that a CPA firm’s economic well-being
depends on its reputation in the community, not on fees from a single client, are
also important factors.
Some critics urge that auditors not be permitted to provide MAS services
because they believe such a prohibition would enhance the quality of audits. How
ever, the AICPA, as well as those who have intimate knowledge of how audits are
carried out, believe that the opposite is true. In MAS engagements, CPAs gain an
in-depth knowledge and understanding of important aspects of a business enter
prise. Like users of financial statements, auditors need to be knowledgeable about
the client’s industry, how it will be affected by the economy, the quality of manage
ment, the effectiveness of internal systems, and similar matters. The more know
ledge the auditor has, the better, because auditors need to be able to judge whether
the portrayal of a company’s transactions in the financial statements are reasonable
in circumstances that are becoming increasingly complex.
Moreover, engaging in MAS work requires CPA firms to develop knowledge
and skills in new technologies that are directly applied to enhance the performance
of audits. For example, the ability to apply computer software and to deal with
complex computer systems has become both a necessity and an effective tool in
auditing large companies. It is doubtful that the auditing profession could develop
and maintain such skills if it were precluded from providing MAS services.
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Some critics argue that auditors are “ auditing their own work” if they perform
MAS for audit clients and that their independence is therefore impaired. This
notion is conceptually flawed in a number of ways.
When CPAs provide MAS they act only as outside advisors. They cannot and do
not usurp management’s authority. Therefore, management must assume responsi
bility for evaluating, accepting, and implementing the CPA’s advice, and AICPA
standards require a clear understanding of this before an MAS engagement is
undertaken. No responsible management, given its basic responsibility and inti
mate knowledge of its business, would let outsiders make its decisions for it.
In any event, in expressing opinions on financial statements, auditors are not
opining on the quality of such things as the client’s systems, organizational struc
ture, or management practices, which are the types of functions on which MAS
advice might be rendered.
The purpose of an audit is to have an outside party review management’s repre
sentations in the financial statements. Unless auditors have, in fact, become a part
of management, they are still outsiders with respect to financial statements even
though they have provided MAS services to a client. The MAS services them
selves have been rendered in the role of an outsider.
In summary, the AICPA believes that it would be a serious mistake to restrict or
prohibit the performance of management advisory services by independent audi
tors. There is no evidence that MAS has impaired the independence of auditors.
Moreover, imposing restrictions would remove an important source of assistance
to American business. The objectivity and analytical skills of CPAs and their
knowledge of a client’s business, organization, and personnel gained through
audits make them an ideal source of advice to management in the most cost-effec
tive manner.
The AICPA and CPAs are highly conscious of their responsibility to guard their
independence at all costs because impairment would destroy the CPA’s role as
auditor. The AICPA, its SEC Practice Section, and CPA firms themselves have
consistently adopted rules and promoted policies designed to bolster the indepen
dence of auditors, including enforceable rules of conduct, creation of audit com
mittees of boards of directors, attendance by auditors at shareholder’s meetings,
management reporting on reasons for changing auditors, CPA firm reporting to
boards of directors on MAS fees from SEC clients, and periodic rotation of part
ners in charge of SEC audits. This is a clear record of sincere desire and dedication
to protect the independence of auditors and indicates that the profession would be
in the forefront of restricting management advisory services for audit clients if
valid reasons for doing so could be demonstrated.
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CONCLUSION
The AICPA asserts that the vast majority of independent audits are of high quality.
However, audit failures resulting from human error do occasionally occur. This
will be so no matter how many institutional controls or technical standards are
adopted. This is not to contend, however, that it is ever appropriate to relax and
cease striving for better financial reporting.
Although the AICPA does not believe that major changes are called for in the
present system of regulation of the profession, in the way accounting and auditing
standards are established, or in the scope of services now being performed by CPA
firms, there are areas where improvements might be made. As indicated below,
some special studies have been begun in important areas and others have been
under way for some time. In addition, there is an ongoing effort by the AICPA to
monitor the effectiveness of auditing standards and to make changes when they are
called for.
1. Discussions are being held with representatives of other organizations to
determine whether a multiorganizational effort might be useful in identify
ing ways to improve the prevention and detection of fraud.
2. A reexamination of the existing auditing guidance with respect to bank loan
loss reserves is being undertaken.
3. A special AICPA committee is studying the relevance of the AICPA Code of
Professional Ethics and the adequacy of the related enforcement machinery
in today’s environment. The special committee is expected to issue a draft
report in the fall of 1985.
4. A task force of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division for CPA
Firms has been studying steps the section might take to enhance profession
alism in the application of accounting standards. Such steps might include
changes in the section’s membership requirements and certain changes in the
scope of peer review.
5. In accordance with the 1984 recommendations of a special committee that
studied the structure and operations of the SEC Practice Section, the section
is presently considering how the public might be made more aware of the
procedures and findings of its Special Investigations Committee.
The AICPA believes these various activities and the record of the progress that
has been made since the last Congressional hearings in 1977 demonstrate the pro
fession’s commitment to excellence and its recognition of the paramount impor
tance of the public interest in the quality of independent audits.
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